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The Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse Case
By Clifford E. Hutton, Michael J. Tucker, and Sheila M. Bradley
In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse1 the 
United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia recently found a 
major public accounting firm guilty of 
sex discrimination when it refused to 
promote a woman manager to partner. 
Only fifteen months earlier, the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 
Hishon v. King & Spalding2 held that 
promotion to partnership in a law firm 
was subject to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964—the first applica­
tion of Title VII to a professional part­
nership.3 The Hishon and Hopkins 
decisions place the whole selection 
process for admission into an account­
ing firm partnership as it relates to the 
admission of minority candidates 
under intense judicial scrutiny.
Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse
In 1982, Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff, 
a female accountant and senior 
manager, was proposed for partner­
ship in Price Waterhouse by her office, 
the Office of Government Services 
(OGS), a division of Price Waterhouse. 
Of the 88 candidates for partnership 
that year, plaintiff was the only 
woman. At that time all of the OGS 
partners were men, and by July 1984 
there were only seven women among 
the 662 partners at Price Waterhouse.
The Court noted plaintiff’s suc­
cessful career as a senior manager 
and her significant role in developing 
business for the firm. None of the 
other partnership candidates com­
peting that year had a comparable 
record in terms of successfully secur­
ing major contracts for the partner­
ship. The record indicated that clients 
were very pleased with the plaintiff’s 
work and that she had no difficulty 
dealing with them. Her proposal for 
partnership was fully endorsed by the 
partners in the OGS office. Price 
Waterhouse admitted that based upon 
technical qualifications the plaintiff’s 
fitness to become a partner was never 
in doubt.
In its partnership selection process, 
Price Waterhouse asks all the part­
ners to not only rank candidates on an 
exhaustive list of relevant, neutral 
criteria, but to make one of three 
recommendations: (1) for admission, 
(2) deny admission, or (3) hold for fur­
ther consideration, and to comment on 
their appraisal. Of the 32 partners who 
submitted evaluations concerning the 
plaintiff, 13 recommended admission, 
8 denial, 3 hold, and 8 had insufficient 
basis for opinion. Many commentators 
felt that Ms. Hopkins had problems 
dealing with fellow employees. These 
comments indicated the plaintiff had 
particular difficulty dealing with lower 
ranking staff members of the firm. 
Both supporters and opponents in­
dicated the plaintiff “was sometimes 
overly aggressive, unduly harsh, dif­
ficult to work with and impatient with 
the staff.’’4 Because of the number of 
negative comments by both sup­
porters and opponents, along with the 
significant number of no votes, most 
by partners who had had limited con­
tact with the candidate, the Admission 
Committee decided to recommend 
that the plaintiff’s admission to the 
partnership should be held at least a 
year in order to afford her time to 
demonstrate the personal and leader­
ship qualities required of a partner.
To improve her chances of making 
partner next year, and at the urging of 
her senior partner, the plaintiff under­
went a Quality Control Review with 
favorable results. This was a process 
by which the plaintiff was given 
pointers to help repair any deficiencies 
prior to the time she was reviewed for 
partner again. Several partners also 
stated that they planned to give her 
opportunities to demonstrate her 
abilities, but apparently never follow­
ed through. Just four months after the 
Policy Board’s recommendation that 
she should be held for a year, the part­
ners in OGS decided not to repropose 
the plaintiff for partnership because 
two partners in the OGS office now 
strongly opposed her candidacy.
When Price Waterhouse advised 
the plaintiff of this decision, and of the 
unlikelihood of admission to partner­
ship, she chose to resign in January, 
1984, rather than try again for admis­
sion into the partnership or remain as 
a senior manager as proposed by the 
defendant. The plaintiff filed suit alleg­
ing sex discrimination in violation of Ti­
tle VII, and asked the Court to order 
that she be made partner and to
Firms may not inject 
stereotyped assumptions 
about women into the selec­
tion process for partnership. 
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award back pay and other monetary 
relief.
Plaintiff’s Argument
The plaintiff argued that the deci­
sion was discriminatory because (1) 
the criticisms of plaintiff’s interper­
sonal skills were inaccurate and un­
true; (2) even if Price Waterhouse 
believed her personal skills were defi­
cient, the partnership routinely admit­
ted male candidates having problems 
with interpersonal skills if they had 
strong qualifications in other areas; (3) 
Price Waterhouse’s critique of the 
plaintiff’s interpersonal skills was a 
result of sexual stereotyping by male 
partners. The firm’s partnership selec­
tion process improperly gave full 
weight to these discriminatory evalua­
tions. Price Waterhouse denied each 
of the allegations and claimed that the 
plaintiff was properly denied partner­
ship because the firm, for legitimate 
business reasons, avoids admitting 
abrasive partners who might jeopar­
dize morale and who were incapable 
of effectively supervising staff 
members.
The Court noted that Ms. Hopkins’ 
inability to get along with staff 
members or peers is a legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for refusing to 
admit her to the partnership. The 
Court accepted as accurate that the 
complaints about the plaintiff’s in­
terpersonal skills were not fabricated 
or a pretext for discrimination. The 
Court acknowledged the plaintiff was 
a hard-driving manager who pushed 
her staff and occasionally used pro­
fanity, but was not persuaded that 
such conduct was relevant to this 
inquiry.
In considering the plaintiff’s allega­
tions, the Court examined the records 
generated by the partnership selection 
at Price Waterhouse for 1982, 1983, 
and 1984. The Court found that Price 
Waterhouse had legitimate, non-dis­
criminatory reasons for distinguishing 
between the plaintiff and the male 
partners with whom she was com­
peting, and that the firm’s emphasis 
on negative comments, did not, by 
itself, result in any discriminatory treat­
ment. The practice of giving great 
weight to “no” votes was applied in 
the same way to male and female can­
didates. Statistics submitted by the 
plaintiff showing the small number of 
women partners at Price Waterhouse 
and the lower selection rate of women
The plaintiff claimed she was 
a victim of sexual 
stereotyping.
for partnership were found to be in­
conclusive because of insufficient 
data or lack of statistical significance.
Major Focus on Sexual 
Stereotyping
The major focus of this case was the 
plaintiff’s third argument: that she was 
a victim of sexual stereotyping, and 
that discriminatory evaluations were 
improperly used by defendant in the 
partnership selection process. The 
plaintiff claimed that she was not eval­
uated as a manager, but as a “woman 
manager,” because those who evalu­
ated her used sexual stereotypes that 
prompt men to regard assertive be­
havior in women as being more offen­
sive and intolerable than comparable 
behavior in men.
Some of the comments noted in­
cluded: “she may have overcompen­
sated for being a woman,” suggesting 
she “take a course at a charm 
school,” came across as “macho,” 
focusing on her profanity “because 
it’s a lady using foul language.” Her 
strongest supporter, the head partner 
at OGS, was responsible for telling her 
what problems she needed to over­
come with her candidacy, and he ad­
vised her to “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear makeup, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”5
The Court analyzed the comments 
made about other women candidates 
for admission to the Price Waterhouse 
partnership and found these com­
ments supported the inference that 
the partnership evaluation process 
used by Price Waterhouse was affect­
ed by sexual stereotyping. The Court 
felt that Price Waterhouse did nothing 
to discourage sexually biased evalua­
tions. The Court used as an example 
of this negligence the comments of a 
partner who repeatedly said he could 
never consider a woman seriously for 
partner and did not think a woman was 
capable of being a senior manager. 
Apparently the court felt that Price 
Waterhouse never acted to discour­
age such comments, and that this 
recommendation was given equal 
consideration with other partner’s 
comments.
The Court took note of the testimony 
of plaintiff’s expert witness on stereo­
typing, and held that stereotyping 
played an undefined role in blocking 
plaintiff’s admission to the partnership 
in this instance. The evidence indi­
cated that the partner’s stereotyping 
behavior though not conscious was 
nonetheless efficacious in blocking 
the plaintiff’s admission to partner­
ship. Prior case law required proof of 
discriminatory motive or purpose to 
establish a claim of disparate treat­
ment based on subjective evalua­
tions.6 Under these prior holdings 
Price Waterhouse could not be found 
guilty of discrimination since any sex­
ual bias in its promotions process was 
unconscious. The District Court held 
however that the use of a system that 
gave weight to such biased criticism 
was a conscious act of the partnership 
as a whole. Furthermore, they indi­
cated that Price Waterhouse should 
have been aware that women might 
well be victims of discriminatory ster­
eotypes when being evaluated by 
male partners. The firm made no ef­
fort to investigate or address this 
issue. A general policy statement of 
equal employment opportunities for all 
minorities issued by Price Waterhouse 
in 1983 was not considered a signifi­
cant attempt since it did not address 
the special concerns of discrimination 
against women in an overwhelmingly 
male partnership.
The Court’s Findings
The Court found that although firms 
are free to use subjective evaluations 
as criteria in selecting employees for 
partners, they are not free to inject 
stereotyped assumptions about 
women into the selection process. The 
firm’s failure to take the steps 
necessary to alert partners to the 
possibility that their judgments may be 
biased, to discourage stereotyping, 
and to investigate and discard, where 
appropriate, comments that suggest a 
promotion and evaluation policy con­
stitutes a violation of Title VII. The 
Court noted the presence of three 
factors which working in combination 
produced the Title VII violation: 1) 
comments influenced by sex stereo­
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types were made by partners, 2) Price 
Waterhouse’s evaluation process 
gave substantial weight to such com­
ments, 3) Price Waterhouse failed to 
address the conspicuous problem of 
stereotyping in its partnership evalua­
tions. While these three factors might 
have been mitigatory in denying plain­
tiff admission to the partnership when 
taken separately, when acting in con­
cert, they produced Ms. Hopkins' re­
jection as a partner. The Court found 
the Policy Board’s decision not to ad­
mit the plaintiff to partnership was 
tainted by discriminatory evaluations 
that were the direct result of its failure 
to address the evident problem of sex­
ual stereotyping in partners’ 
evaluations.
Acknowledging the plaintiff might 
still not have been elected to partner­
ship without the stereotyped evalua­
tions, the Court stated that once 
discrimination has been proved, the 
burden of proof is on the employer to 
prove that the decision would have 
been the same, and that Price Water­
house did not present that proof. 
Therefore the defendant was found 
guilty of sex discrimination.
Because the plaintiff had voluntarily 
resigned, and was unable to prove 
constructive discharge, the Court 
denied her request for an order that 
she be made a partner. Because the 
parties agreed privately to defer con­
sideration of backpay until after the 
issue of liability was resolved without 
the knowledge or consent of the 
Court, the Court found that it could not 
consider that issue, and awarded on­
ly attorney fees to the plaintiff.
Conclusion
Title VII requires affirmative action 
to root out discriminatory promotion 
standards, not just neutrality or a lack 
of discrimination. The Court’s focus on 
Price Waterhouse’s selection process 
in Hopkins showed that the choice of 
neutral criteria in the evaluation pro­
cess is not sufficient, the criteria must 
be used neutrally. In repeatedly citing 
the defendant for failure to recognize 
and act upon obvious bias, the Court 
demonstrated that a company has a 
positive responsibility to prevent such 
bias in its employment practices. The 
Court did not find a general statement 
of a policy of equal opportunity at all 
adequate, but indicated a need for a 
policy that addressed the specific con­
cerns of women.
It is apparent the Courts are seek­
ing, and will be satisfied with no less 
than a comprehensive program to en­
sure that minorities are treated equally 
in the entire employment process. 
This will require more than reacting to 
evidence of bias, and the education of 
personnel to the existence of stereo­
typing and its consequences. Com­
panies will need to assess whether in 
their training practices, selection of 
assignments, etc., minorities are not 
penalized by outmoded perceptions. 
An often unconsciously held notion 
about women is that pregnancy 
means resignation or that women will 
leave after a few years of marriage. 
Several surveys have shown, 
however, that women change jobs for 
the same reasons as men—profes­
sional, work-related considerations.7
“Client resistance’’ to women is 
another widespread perception with 
which the Courts may have little pa­
tience, and may find that the company 
has a duty to provide their women 
employees with at least equal expo­
sure to clients, and even with educa­
tional programs structured to make up 
for a lack of such experience.
Public accounting firms may need 
to look to the experience of firms like 
Merck which “has a program that 
identified 10 percent of its women and 
10 percent of minorities as ‘most pro­
mising.’ The company prepares a writ­
ten agenda of what it will take for them 
to move up to the next level. Progress 
upward may mean changing jobs or 
switching functions, so Merck cir­
culates their credentials throughout 
the company. ‘We have a timetable 
and we track these women careful­
ly,’...Since 1979 almost 40 percent of 
the net growth in Merck’s managerial 
staff has been women.’’8
Support and encouragement by 
management is crucial in retaining 
talented employees of both sexes.
Firms may use subjective 
evaluations as criteria in 
selecting employees for 
partners.
Perceived prejudice of any accounting 
firm against women may encourage 
women to look elsewhere for oppor­
tunities to use their talents. All the 
traditionally male dominated profes­
sions are having to adapt, often reluc­
tantly, to the growing presence of 
women.
These issues have implications for 
minorities other than women, who 
might argue that neutral standards 
may be misused by white males who 
unconsciously rely upon stereotypes 
when making promotion decisions. 
There is no doubt that neutrality in ap­
plying promotion standards will be es­
sential in avoiding costly lawsuits and 
the loss of valued professionals. Ω
NOTES
1 Civil Action No. 84-3040. filed September 
20, 1985.
2 104 S. Ct. 2228 (1984).
3 The relevant portion of Title VII states that: 
a. It shall be unlawful employment practice for 
an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge an individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such in­
dividual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.
4 No. 1 supra., page 5.
5 No. 1 supra., pages 15-16.
6 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
7 No. 8 supra., p. 31 and Melanie Walkup and 
Debra Fenzau, "Women CPA’s: Why Do They 
Leave Public Accounting,’’ The Woman CPA. 
October, 1980, page 4.
8 Susan Fraker, ‘‘Why Women Aren't Getting 
To The Top,” Fortune, April 16, 1984, p. 45.
Clifford E. Hutton, Ph.D., is trustees 
professor of accounting at the Univer­
sity of Tulsa. He holds a Ph.D. from the 
University of Texas at Austin. He has 
served as dean of the Colleges of Busi­
ness Administration at the University of 
Tulsa and at North Texas State Univer­
sity.
Michael J. Tucker, Ph.D., is associate 
professor accounting at the University 
of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma. He holds a 
Ph.D. from the University of Houston.
Sheila M. Bradley is a graduate 
research assistant at The University of 
Tulsa.
The Woman CPA, July, 1986/5
